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ABSTRACT
This is the introduction and summary to the fourth phase of an ongoing project on Social Security
Programs and Retirement Around the World. The first phase described the retirement incentives inherent
in plan provisions and documented the strong relationship across countries between social security
incentives to retire and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force. The second phase documented
the large effects that changing plan provisions would have on the labor force participation of older
workers. The third phase demonstrated the consequent fiscal implications that extending labor force
participation would have on net program costs—reducing government social security benefit payments
and increasing government tax revenues.
 
This volume presents the results of analyses of the relationship between the labor force participation
of older persons and the labor force participation of younger persons in twelve countries. Why countries
introduced plan provisions that encouraged older persons to leave the labor force is unclear. After
the fact, it is now often claimed that these provisions were introduced to provide more jobs for the
young, assuming that fewer older persons in the labor force would open up more job opportunities
for the young. Now, the same reasoning is often used to argue against efforts in the same countries
to reduce or eliminate the incentives for older persons to leave the labor force, claiming that the consequent
increase in the employment of older person would reduce the employment of younger persons. The
validity of such claims is addressed in this volume.
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  Several years ago we began an international project to study the 
relationship between social security program provisions and retirement.  Under 
pay-as-you-go social security systems most developed countries have made 
promises they can’t keep.  The systems in their current forms are not financially 
sustainable.  What caused the problem?  It has been common to assume that the 
problem was caused by aging populations.  The number of older persons has 
increased very rapidly relative to the number of younger persons and this trend 
will continue.  Thus the proportion of retirees has increased relative to the 
number of employed persons who must pay for the benefits of those who are 
retired.    In addition, persons are living longer so that those who reach retirement 
age are receiving benefits longer than they used to.  The effect of aging 
populations and increasing longevity has been compounded by another trend: 
until recently older persons had been leaving the labor force at younger and 
younger ages, further increasing the ratio of retirees to employed persons.   What 
has not been widely appreciated is that the provisions of social security programs 
themselves often provide strong incentives to leave the labor force.  By 
penalizing work, social security systems magnify the increased financial burden 
caused by aging populations and thus contribute to their own insolvency. 
  Why countries introduced plan provisions that encouraged older persons 
to leave the labor force is unclear.  After the fact, it is now often claimed that 
these provisions were introduced to provide more jobs for the young, assuming 
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for the young.  In some cases this may have been a motivation for the provisions 
but in other instances it was not, as shown by illustrations presented below.   
Now, the same reasoning is also often used to argue against efforts in the same 
countries to reduce or eliminate the incentives for older persons to leave the 
labor force, claiming that the consequent increase in the employment of older 
person would reduce the employment of younger persons.  Here are a few 
examples:  
•  “The Job Release Scheme is “a measure which allows older workers to 
retire early in order to release jobs for the registered unemployed”  (The 
United Kingdom:  the 1977 Labour Government: SOURCE …) 
 
•  “We will extend the voluntary Job Release Scheme to men over 60 so that 
those who want to retire early vacate jobs for those who are currently 
unemployed. This could take as many as 160,000 people out of 
unemployment and into work.”  (The United Kingdom:  the 1987 Labour 
Party manifesto says: SOURCE …) 
 
•  “And I would like to speak to the elders, to those who have spent their 
lifetime working in this region, and well, I would like them to show the way, 
that life must change; when it is time to retire, leave the labor force in 
order to provide jobs for your sons and daughters. That is what I ask you. 
The Government makes it possible for you to retire at age 55. Then retire, 
with one’s head held high, proud of your worker’s life. This is what we are 
going to ask you… This is the “contrat de solidarité” [an early retirement 
scheme available to the 55+ who quit their job]. That those who are the 
oldest, those who have worked, leave the labor force, release jobs so that 
everyone can have a job.”  (France: Pierre Mauroy, French Prime Minister, 
in Lille 27
th September 1981, quoted in Gaullier (1982), L’avenir à 
reculons, page 230.) 
 
•  “The lowering of the retirement age strengthens the positive effects on 
employment that early retirement policies made possible. It even widens 
these positive effects as a larger share of the population is concerned.”  
(France: Ministry of Employment, in La retraite à 60 ans, Droit social n°4 – 
avril 1983.) 
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today, because we cannot hide from the fact that we risk losing a whole 
generation of young persons from the labour market and from society as a 
whole.” (Denmark, with respect to the Post Employment Wage: The 
Minister of Labour, Svend Auken, Proceedings of Parliament, 1978).  
 
The validity of such claims is addressed in this volume.  It presents the results of 
analyses of the relationship between the labor force participation of older persons 
and the labor force participation of younger persons in twelve countries. 
  This is the fourth phase of the ongoing project. The first phase described 
the retirement incentives inherent in plan provisions and documented the strong 
relationship across countries between social security incentives to retire and the 
proportion of older persons out of the labor force (Gruber and Wise 1999).  The 
second phase, based on microeconomic analysis of the relationship between a 
person’s decision to retire and the program incentives faced by that person, 
documented the large effects that changing plan provisions would have on the 
labor force participation of older workers.  (Gruber and Wise 2004)  The third 
phase demonstrated the consequent fiscal implications that extending labor force 
participation would have on net program costs—reducing government social 
security benefit payments and increasing government tax revenues.  (Gruber and 
Wise 2007)  The analyses in the first two phases, as well as the analysis in the 
third phase, are summarized in the introduction to the third phase. 
  The results of the ongoing project are the product of analyses conducted 
for each country by analysts in that country.  Researchers who have participated 
in the project are listed below.  The authors of the country papers in this volume 
  5 of 74 are listed first; others who have participated in one or more of the first three 
phases are listed second and shown in italics 
 Belgium   Alain  Jousten,  Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, 
Pierre Pestieau, Raphaël Desmet, Arnaud Dellis, and 
Jean-Philippe Stijns 
 Canada   Michael  Baker,  Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan    
 Denmark   Paul  Bingley,  Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J. 
Pedersen 
  France    Melika Ben Salem, Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, 
Muriel Roger, Ronan Mahieu, Louis-Paul Pelé, and 
Emmanuelle Walraet 
  Germany    Axel Börsch-Supan, Reinhold Schnabel, Simone 
Kohnz, and Giovanni Mastrobuoni 
 Italy    Agar  Brugiavini  and  Franco  Peracchi     
 Japan    Takashi  Oshio,  Satoshi  Shimizutani, Akiko Sato Oishi, 
    and  Naohiro Yashiro  
  Netherlands    Adriaan Kalwij, Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos      
  Spain     Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, Pilar Garcia 
Gomez and Franco Peracchi   
  Sweden    Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson        
  United Kingdom  James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antonio Bozio, Carl 
Emmerson, Paul Johnson, Costas Meghir, and Sarah 
Smith  
 United  States Jonathan  Gruber, Kevin Milligan, Courtney Coile and 
Peter Diamond 
  
  An important goal of the project has been to present results that were as 
comparable as possible across countries.  Thus the papers for each phase were 
prepared according to a detailed template that we prepared in consultation with 
country participants.   
  In this introduction, we summarize the collective results of the country 
analyses.  In large part, the results presented in the introduction could only be 
conveyed by combined analysis of the data from each of the countries.  The 
country papers themselves present much more detail for each country and, in 
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specific analysis relevant to a particular country.    
  The proposition that more work by older persons reduces the job 
opportunities for younger persons put forth in many different forms.  It is 
sometimes referred to by economists as the “lump of labor” theory.  Taken 
literally, this statement of the theory says that if an additional older worker is 
employed one younger worker must be displaced.  The implication is that 
economies are boxed and that the box cannot be enlarged.   
  In this volume, we emphasize the relationship between the employment 
rate of older persons and the unemployment and employment rates of younger 
persons, in particular youth.  We emphasize employment and unemployment 
rates because public discourse about the relationship is typically in terms of 
these rates—that the unemployment rate of youth, for example, will be increased 
if incentives for older persons to leave the labor force are eliminated.   
1.  The Context 
  At first glance, it seems clear that economies are not boxed.  The flow of 
women into the labor force in the past few decades has increased the size of the 
labor force enormously in many countries.  For example, the number of women in 
the labor force in the United Stated increased by almost 48 million between 1960 
and 2007, from about 34 percent to 46 percent of the labor force.  But the 
employment rate of men changed little as the proportion of women employed 
increased.  Figure 1-1 shows the percent change in the employment rate of men 
compared to the percent increase in the female employment rate in the twelve 
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which the change occurred varies from country to country.  The longest period is 
from 1960 to 2006 (in Germany) and the shortest from 1983 to 2004 (in Belgium).  
Two features of the data stand out.  First, there was a small decline in the 
employment rate of men over this time period in all but one of the countries, but, 
second, on average, the smallest of the small declines were in the countries with 
the largest increase in the employment rate for women.  For example, in the 
Netherlands, the employment rate of women increased by 54 percentage points, 
but the employment rate of men declined by only 1 percentage point.  Very 
similar results are obtained if the same span of years is used for all countries—
1983 to 2004.   
  The results are summarized more succinctly in Figure 1-2 that compares 
the six countries with the smallest to the six countries with the largest increase in 
the employment rate of women.  The results are shown both for the variable-
years version and the same-years version.  The smallest of the small decreases 
in the employment of men are in the countries with the greatest increase in the 
employment rate of women.  For example, for the same years (1983 to 2003) the 
average increase in the employment rate of women was 23 percentage points in 
the countries with the greatest increase and in these countries the decline in the 
employment rate of men was only 2 percentage points.  On the other hand, the 
average increase in the employment rate of women was only 6 percentage points 
in the countries with the smallest increase in the employment rate of women and 
the decline in the employment rate of men in these countries was 4 percentage 
  8 of 74 points.  In seems clear that the small decline in the employment rate of men was 
not tied to the increase in the employment of women.  The boxed economy 
proposition seems quite inconsistent with these data.  
Figure 1-1.  Relationship between the increase in 
female employment rates and change in male 









































  9 of 74 Figure 1-2.  Compare the 6 countries with smallest 
increase with the 6 with the greatest increase in 










































Why did the employment of men not decline when women entered the 
labor force in large numbers?  The reason is that the economies grew and 
employed more people.  Then why is it common for many observers to assume 
that a new entrant into the labor force must “crowd out” someone who is currently 
employed?  Or, that a new employee can be hired only if a current employee 
leaves?  Perhaps one reason is that this might be the case in one’s own 
workplace at any given moment.  A university president may say that the classics 
department can only make one new hire this year, but if someone retirees, two 
new hires can be made.  But over time, the number of professors typically 
increases as the number of students increases.  The “university economy” grows 
over time and the total number of employees increases.  Even if the number of 
employees in one company or one industry can not increase in a given year (or 
  10 of 74 even in the long run in declining industries) this will not be true for the economy 
as a whole.  Some companies or industries are declining but others are growing.  
As women entered the labor force, the growing segments of the economy far 
outstripped the declining segments. 
Could there be another relationship between the old and the young?  That 
is the question we address in this volume. 
2.  The Country Papers and the Data 
  Each of the country papers begins with an historical summary of the 
changes in social security program provisions over the past three or four 
decades.  The key question is whether social security plan provisions, that 
provide incentives for older persons to leave the labor force, were prompted by 
concerns about youth unemployment in particular.  The evidence is based on a 
review of legislation, press coverage, and other public discussion proceeding 
program changes.  The evidence gained in this way is further checked against 
corresponding empirical evidence.  For each country, the relationship between 
the timing of program reforms and the trends in the employment of older persons 
and the employment and unemployment of youth is described graphically.  For 
example, if public discussion suggests the program changes may have been 
prompted by increasing youth unemployment, does the data show an increase in 
youth unemployment prior to the program reform?   
The reason for emphasizing the extent to which the program provisions—
that induce older persons to leave the labor force—were prompted by youth 
unemployment is to help to interpret the key relationships that are estimated in 
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the country papers are regression estimates of the relationship between the 
employment rates of persons 55 to 64 on the one hand and the employment and 
unemployment of youth 20 to 24 and prime age persons 25 to 54 on the other 
hand.  Several different estimation specifications of these relationships are 
presented.   
These estimates follow on the estimates in previous phases of the project.  
As noted above, the first phase of the project documented the strong relationship 
across countries between program provisions that induce retirement and the 
proportion of older persons out of the labor force.  The second phase was based 
on micro estimation of the relationship between the retirement incentives faced 
by individuals and their retirement decisions.  The central finding is the strong 
relationship between social security program provisions that penalize work and 
departure from the labor force.  Now, the question is whether the departure of 
older persons from the labor force expands the job opportunities of youth.   
The trends in the employment of older persons, however, reflect all 
determinants of the employment of older persons, not only the social security 
program incentives to leave the labor force.  Thus, In addition to the template 
components of the country analyses, that are common to each of the country 
papers, a few of the country papers also present additional information that helps 
to explain the developments in that country.  For example, while the estimates—
of the “direct” effect of the employment of the old on the employment of the 
young—are the central focus of the analysis in this phase, we have also 
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over time in the incentives inherent in social security plan provisions and the 
employment of the young.  The reason for considering this question was to 
address more directly the effects of plan provisions that are the subject of public 
discussion.  This goal turned out to be very difficult to accomplish on a 
comparable basis across countries.  In particular, we were unable, on a 
consistent basis across countries, to obtain a reliable measure of the average 
incentives faced by persons retired in a given year.  Perhaps most important, 
even if the average were measured well, the average may not adequately 
capture the wide range of incentives faced by individuals.  In short, the procedure 
we explored was not replicable across countries.  Thus, such estimates are 
presented in only a few of the country papers.  
  The illustrations and the cross-country analyses presented in this 
introduction are based on data provided by each country.  Key data series are 
shown here.  Much of the answer to the central question posed in this volume 
can be seen in the data themselves.   
Figures 2-1a to 2-1l show the data for each country.  The first panel of 
each figure shows the actual data for three series—the employment of persons 
55 to 64 (E 55-64), the employment of youth 20 to 24 (E 20-24), and the 
unemployment of youth 20 to 24 (UE 20-24).
1  To simplify the figures, we have 
not shown data for prime age persons (age 25 to 54).  The employment and 
unemployment rates for the prime age group typically parallel closely the rates of 
                                                 
1 In Sweden the data for youth are for the age range 16 to 24. 
  13 of 74 youth and both series are shown in the country papers.  In the analysis below we 
present results for prime age persons, as well as for youth. 
The figures below show two versions of the data for each country.  The 
first panel shows the actual data as reported for each country.  The second panel 
shows the data adjusted for changes in GDP per capita, GDP growth, and the 
proportion of GDP generated by manufacturing.
2  The years for which data are 
available varies from country to country.  The longest period is from 1960 to 2006 
(in Germany) and the shortest period from 1983 to 2004 (in Belgium).   
  To obtain the adjusted data for a given country, we first determine how 
each of the three employment series varies with GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
and the “manufacturing share” in that country.  Then beginning with the first year 
of data for that country, the data for each subsequent year is adjusted based on 
the change in the predictor variables between the first year and the subsequent 
year.  The same procedure is followed for each of the countries.  (The details are 
shown in the appendix.)  Thus the adjusted series eliminates the movement in 
each of the series that can be predicted by the change over time in the 
adjustment variables in that country.  In particular, each of the employment series 
is adjusted for macroeconomic shocks to the economy that tend to affect each of 
the series.  Of course the employment series may be affected by other influences 
                                                 
2 The adjustment in the United States, Japan, Spain, and Sweden is based on GDP per capita and GDP 
growth only because the proportion of GDP generated by manufacturing is not available in all years for 
these countries. 
  14 of 74 imperfectly controlled for by the adjustment variables.  Some such influences are 
mentioned in the country papers.
3 
  In the subsequent analyses, we often show results based on both 
unadjusted and adjusted data.  Both are shown for two reasons: One is that we 
often want to observe youth employment or unemployment rates prior to a given 
reform in a country.  For this purpose we what to use the unadjusted data.  The 
second reason is that it isn’t clear that estimates based on the adjusted data 
always yield the best estimate of the effect of employment of the old on the 
employment of the young. 
  In addition, prolonged upward and downward trends in the employment of 
persons 55 to 64 are marked by left-right arrows in each of the figures.  The 
arrows positions are determined on the basis of the unadjusted data and are in 
the same positions on the adjusted data figures.  These prolonged upward and 
downward intervals are used in subsequent analysis. 
  Three features of the data stand out.  First, in each country, the 
unadjusted data show substantial correlation among the series.  As might be 
expected, the employment of youth is positively correlated with the employment 
of older persons.  The unemployment of youth is negatively correlated with the 
employment of older persons.  That is, macro “shocks” to the economy affect 
employment at all ages and in the same direction.  Second, the variation over 
time in each of the series is typically reduced when the change associated with 
economic output per capita is controlled for.  In some countries, the smoothing of 
                                                 
3 For example, in France there was a change in the Labor Force Survey in 2002 and a change in the work 
week schedule in 2000.  
  15 of 74 the series trends is substantial.  Third, and most important for our analysis, even 
after adjusting for economic growth and the manufacturing share much of the 
relationship between the employment of the old and the young remains.  
  Simple perusal of the data reveals no evidence that increases in the 
employment of older persons are related to a reduction in the employment of 
younger persons, or that decreases in the employment of older persons are 
associated with increases in the unemployment of younger persons. 
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Figure 2-1a. Belgium: employment of the old and 










































































































  17 of 74 Figure 2-1b. Canada: employment of the old and 

















































































Figure 2-1b. Canada: employment of the old and 

















































































  18 of 74 Figure 2-1c. Germany: employment of the old and 


















































































Figure 2-1c. Germany: employment of the old and 

































































































































































































































Figure 2-1d. Denmark: employment of the old and 













































































































































  20 of 74 Figure 2-1e. Spain: employment of the old and the 









































































































































Figure 2-1e. Spain: employment of the old and the 









































































































































  21 of 74 Figure 2-1f. France: employment of the old and the 
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Figure 2-1f. France: employment of the old and the 





























































































  22 of 74 Figure 2-1g. Italy: employment of the old and the 

































































































































Figure 2-1g. Italy: employment of the old and the 

































































































































  23 of 74 Figure 2-1h. Japan: employment of the old and the 












































































































Figure 2-1h. Japan: employment of the old and the 













































































































  24 of 74 Figure 2-1i. Netherlands: employment of the old 




















































































































































Figure 2-1i. Netherlands: employment of the old 





















































































































































  25 of 74 Figure 2-1j. Sweden: employment of the old and 





































































































Figure 2-1j. Sweden: employment of the old and 





































































































  26 of 74 Figure 2-1k. United Kingdom: employment of the 





























































































Figure 2-1k. United Kingdom: employment of the 





























































































  27 of 74 Figure 2-1l. United States: employment of the old 













































































































Figure 2-1l. United States: employment of the old 













































































































  28 of 74 We next consider a series of estimates of the relationship between the 
employment of older persons and the employment of youth and we show key 
results for prime age persons as well.   In section 3 we begin by showing how the 
tax force to retire—emphasized in the first phase of the project—is related to the 
employment of youth and prime age persons.  In section 4 we show illustrative 
within-country “natural experiment” comparisons that help to demonstrate the 
relationship between within-country reforms and the consequent changes in the 
employment of the old on the one hand and changes in the employment of the 
young on the other hand.  In section 5, we show cross-country comparisons 
based on various comparison methods.  To simplify the presentations in sections 
4 and 5 we show results only for youth.  In section 6, we show more formal 
estimates based on panel regression analysis.  In this section we show estimates 
for prime age persons, as well as for youth.  As it turns out, all of the various 
estimation methods yield very consistent results.  In particular, there is no 
evidence that reducing the employment of older persons provides more job 
opportunities for younger persons.  And, there is no evidence that increasing the 
labor force participation of older persons reduces the job opportunities of younger 
persons.  In section 7 we summarize the results.  
3.  The Employment of Youth and the Tax Force to Retire 
  We begin by recalling the key finding from the first phase of the project in 
which we considered the “tax force to retire.”  The tax force to retire can be 
explained in this way:  Compensation for working another year, say at age 60, 
can be divided into two parts—the wage earnings for an additional year of work 
  29 of 74 and the change in the present value of future social security benefits.  One might 
suppose that if benefits will be received for one fewer years, then annual benefits 
will be increased enough to offset their receipt of one fewer years.  This is 
typically not the case, however.  The present value of benefits declines in most 
countries.  In some countries, the reduction in benefits is greater than 80 percent 
of wage earnings.  We then consider the sum of these percents (the ratio of the 
loss in benefits to wage earnings) from the early retirement age in a country to 
age 69.  We call this sum the tax force to retire. 
  The relationship between the tax force to retire and the proportion of men 
55 to 65 was shown in the summary to the Phase I volume (Gruber and Wise 
1999).  One version of that relationship is reproduced as Figure 3-1.  The strong 
relationship between the tax force to retire and the proportion of older men out of 
the labor force is apparent. 
  If the incentives that reduced the proportion of older persons in the labor 
force—increased the proportion out of the labor force—increase the job 
opportunities of young persons, then the tax force to retire should be related to 
youth employment.  The greater the tax force to retire, the lower youth 
unemployment should be and the greater youth employment should be.  And 
analogous relationships should be true for prime age persons.  But this is not the 
case. 
Figure 3-2 is the same as Figure 3-1 but with the addition of the 
unemployment rate of young men 20 to 24.  Essentially there is no relationship 
across countries between the tax force for older persons to retire and the 
  30 of 74 unemployment of young men.  Indeed, the actual relationship is slightly 
positive—the greater the tax force to retire the greater is youth unemployment. 
Figure 3-3 shows the unemployment rate of all youth, male and female 
combined.  Again there is a slightly positive relationship between the tax force to 
induce older persons to leave the labor force and the unemployment rate of 
youth 20 to 24. 
Figure 3-4 shows the relationship between the tax force for older persons 
to leave the labor force and the employment of youth 20 to 24.   If inducing older 
persons to leave the labor force provides more jobs for the young, then the tax 
force to retire—which is strongly related to the proportion of older persons out of 
the labor force—should also be strongly related to the employment of youth.  But 
in fact the opposite is true.  The greater the tax force to retire, the lower the 
employment rate of youth. 
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 show the relationship between the tax force for older 
persons to leave the labor force and the unemployment and employment of 
prime age persons 25 to 54.  Like the results for youth, the greater the tax force 
to retire the greater the unemployment and the lower the employment of prime 
age persons 25 to 54. 
In short, these results provide no evidence that inducing older persons to 
leave the labor force frees up jobs for the young.  If anything, the opposite is true; 
paying for old persons to leave the labor force reduces the employment rate and 
increases the unemployment rate of youth and of persons in their prime age 
working years.   





































Figure 3-2. Tax force to retire, men 55-65 out of the 






































  32 of 74 Figure 3-3. Tax force to retire, men 55-65 out of the 






































Figure 3-4. Tax force to retire, men 55-65 out of the 
























































  33 of 74 Figure 3-5. Tax force to retire, men 55-65 out of the 























































Figure 3-6. Tax force to retire, men 55-65 out of the 
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4.  Within-Country Estimates of the Relationship between the Employment 
of the Old and the Young 
 
In many instances it is possible to trace employment trends for both young 
and older workers that preceded a social security reform in a country and then to 
trace the effect of the reform on the labor force participation of older workers and, 
in turn, the relationship between the effect on older workers and the effect on 
younger workers.  Several such illustrations are presented here.  The illustrations 
serve two important purposes.  One reason is simply to demonstrate—as we 
have in prior phases of the project—the effects of reform on the labor force 
participation of older workers, and then to show the corresponding effect on 
younger persons.   
The second reason to present the illustrations is to help to judge the 
extent to which the further results shown below are affected by an important 
issue that complicates estimation of the causal relationship between employment 
of the old and the young.  Suppose—as is now often claimed—that the program 
provisions that induced older persons to leave the labor force were prompted by 
increasing youth unemployment.  In this case, a decline in youth unemployment 
following the introduction of retirement incentives could simply have been a 
continuation of the pre-incentive decline, and not caused by the incentive-
induced decline in the employment of older persons.   To address this issue, we 
have selected some examples in which specific reforms were apparently not 
prompted by concerns about youth unemployment (or employment).  We call 
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want examples where the reform that induced older persons to leave the labor 
force was “exogenous.”  That is, not motivated by the employment or 
unemployment of youth.  Or, we want examples that are not contaminated by the 
“endogeneity” problem.  There is no sure way to correct for the problem, to the 
extent that it exists.  But, as comparison with subsequent results show, the 
“natural experiment” results—that are not contaminated by endogeneity—are 
very similar to the findings from comparisons in which we are less sure of the 
extent of endogeneity.  Thus the fact that later results are much like the findings 
from these and other natural experiments lends credence to the results obtained 
by other estimation methods.    
We have emphasized the “endogeneity” issue.  The natural experiment 
illustrations also address an additional and closely related issue.  Economic 
shocks to the economy are likely to induce parallel movements in both the 
employment of the old and the employment of the young.  We would like to 
evaluate the effect of precipitating events that are intended to induce older 
persons to leave the labor force, without a contemporaneous influence on the 
employment of the young—unlike macro economic shocks that tend to affect 
both simultaneously.   The illustrations below also avoid the confounding effect of 
economic shocks.  Thus the fact that later results are much like the natural 
experiment findings also adds credence to later results that could be confounded 
by imperfect control for macro shocks. 
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retirement age in Germany was 65, except for disability, and there was no social 
security early retirement age.  But legislation in 1972 provided for early 
retirement at age 60 for women and at age 63 for men (given the accumulation of 
35 required social security work years).  In addition, increased liberal use of 
disability and unemployment benefits effectively expanded the early retirement 
option.  Beginning in 1972 (with further provisions over the next 20 years), social 
security early retirement benefits were made available with no actuarial reduction 
in benefits available at the normal retirement age; benefits if taken at the early 
retirement age were the same as if they were taken at the normal retirement age.  
Delayed benefits were increased only through years of service, about 2.2 percent 
a each year, well below an actuarially fair adjustment.  The 1972 reform greatly 
increased the incentive to leave the labor force early.  Over the next four years 
the employment rate of persons 55 to 64 fell by about seven percentage points, a 
decrease of over 17 percent. 
Looking at the unadjusted data in Figure 2-1c, it seems clear that this 
change could not have been motivated by an increase in the unemployment rate 
of youth, since this rate had been very low throughout the prior decade.  The 
employment rate of youth had been falling in previous years, however.  The 
adjusted data show essentially no change in either the unemployment or the 
employment rate over the prior 6 years, however. 
The 1992 reform introduced actuarial adjustment of benefits, to be phased 
in beginning in 1998.  In addition, benefits were based on net wages, rather than 
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this reform reduced the incentive for older persons to leave the labor force, it 
could not have been motivated by the desire to provide jobs for the young by 
inducing older persons to leave the labor force.  Indeed, the labor force of older 
persons increased following this reform.  Between 1997 and 2006, the 
employment rate of older persons increased from about 0.40 to 0.49, an increase 
of about 23 percent. 
What was the effect of these reforms on the employment of youth?  The 
results are shown in Figures 4-1a and b.  Figure 4-1a shows results based on the 
unadjusted data.  A seven percentage point reduction in the employment rate of 
older persons between 1972 and 1976 was associated with a two percentage 
point reduction in the employment of youth, not an increase, and was associated 
with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate of youth, not a 
reduction.   The 15 percentage point increase in the employment rate of older 
persons following the1998 actuarial adjustment phase-in was associated with no 
change, not a decrease, in employment rate of youth and a slight reduction, not 
an increase, in the unemployment rate of youth.  The results based on the 
adjusted data, shown in Figure 4-1b are essentially the same.  Thus the effect of 
these reforms was quite inconsistent with the boxed economy view of the 
German economy. 
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Figure 4-1b.  Response to reforms in Germany, 
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The experience in France provides another, but somewhat more complex, 
illustration.  Prior to 1972, the French normal social security retirement age was 
65 and early retirement provisions were uncommon.  Beginning in the early 
1970s there was a series of reforms that provided early retirement incentives, 
including more generous benefits and guaranteed income for persons age 60 
and over who lost their jobs.  The first of the series of reforms was encoded in 
the Loi Boulin of 1971.   A further series of reforms was put in place between 
1977 and 1983.  In 1983, age 60 became the normal retirement age.     
Prior to 1972, the youth employment rate was rising and the youth 
unemployment rate had increased only slightly.  Thus it seems unlikely that the 
1971 reform was prompted by youth employment concerns.  By the time of the 
reforms beginning in 1977, however, the youth unemployment rate was rising 
and the youth employment rate had begun to fall.  Even though it appears that 
the fall in youth employment and rise in youth unemployment were tied to the 
reforms in the early 1970s, some proponents of the 1977 and 1983 reforms used 
the, by then, deteriorating youth employment and unemployment trends to justify 
the reforms.   That is, while the first of the series of reforms—that induced older 
persons to leave the labor force—could not have been justified by adverse trends 
in youth employment and unemployment, by the time of the later reforms in the 
series, after the youth trends had deteriorated on the heals of the early reforms, 
the deterioration was used to justify further inducement for older persons to 
retire.  Thus, while the first of the long series reforms seem exogenous with 
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unclear. 
In 1993, there was a reversal.  The number of years of work required to 
earn full benefits was raised from 37.5 to 40 years and the rules for computing 
the replacement rate became less generous.  If seems evident that the 1993 
reform could not have been prompted by the continuing adverse trends in youth 
employment.   
Here we consider the combined effects of the 1971 and subsequent 
reforms, using the period 1972 to 1993.  (In the next section we compare reforms 
in France and the UK and use a somewhat different range of years.) 
  The results of these reforms can be seen in Figures 4-2a and 4-2b.  
Figure 4-2a, based on unadjusted data, shows that as the employment of older 
persons fell by about 21 percentage points between 1971 and 1993, the 
employment of youth also fell by approximately an equal percent.  And the youth 
unemployment rate increased.  In short, the series of reforms was very 
successful in inducing older persons to leave the labor force.  But to the extent 
that the reforms were prompted by hope of providing more job opportunities for 
youth (only the later reforms in the series), they failed.  There is no evidence that 
the reforms provided more jobs for youth.        
On the other hand, when the employment of older persons increased 
between 1993 and 2005, the employment of youth also increased and the 
unemployment of youth declined.  The adjusted employment series for France 
show substantially reduced fluctuations in the employment trends over time, as 
  41 of 74 can be seen by comparing the unadjusted and the adjusted series in Figure 2-1f.  
Nonetheless, the direction of the changes are the same when based on adjusted 
data, as shown in Figure 4-2b.  Again, the results show no evidence of the boxed 
economy proposition.   
Figure 4-2a.  Response to reforms in France, 1971-











































  A reform in Denmark provides a very striking example.  In 1979, the Post 
Employment Wage (PEW) program was introduced.   It induced an almost 
immediate 28 percent drop in the labor force participation rate of men 61 to 65.  
Prior to the 1979 reform, the employment rate of youth had been increasing and 
the unemployment rate of youth had changed little since 1975.  Thus it seems 
unlikely that the reform was prompted by a fall in the employment rate or an 
increase in the unemployment rate of youth.  The response to this reform is 
shown in Figure 4-2a, based on unadjusted data.  Between 1978 and 1983 the 
employment rate of men 61 to 65 fell by almost 23 percentage points, a decline 
of 35 percent.  Over the same period the employment rate of all youth 20 to24 fell 
by about 4 percentage points and the unemployment rate of youth increased by 
about 4 percentage points.  The results based on adjusted data are shown in 
  43 of 74 Figure 4-3b and tell the same story.  Again, this “natural experiment” shows no 
evidence of the boxed economy proposition.    
In short, each of these “natural experiments” is consistent one with the 
other, and none of them is consistent with the boxed economy proposition. 
Figure 4-3a.  Response to the 1979 reform in 




























  44 of 74 Figure 4-3b.  Response to the 1979 reform in 








































  45 of 74 5.  Cross-Country Estimates of the Relationship between the Employment 
of the Old and the Young 
 
  The examples in the section above are “natural experiment” estimates of 
the effects of reforms in selected countries.  The results in this section are based 
on cross-country comparisons. 
  Before considering comparisons across all countries, we begin by 
comparing the employment trends in two countries—the United Kingdom and in 
France—and then by comparing natural experiment estimates of the responses 
to reform in the two countries.  These two countries provide an illustration of the 
effect of differences in reform on the employment of older persons and, in turn, 
on the consequent tie between the employment of older persons and the 
employment of youth.  
  Figure 5-1 is abstracted from Figure X in the United Kingdom chapter that 
shows trends for four age groups.  Figure 5-1 shows employment trends for the 
60 to 64 age group only.  Between 1968 and 1983, the trends were similar in 
both countries.  Prior to 1972, the French normal social security retirement age 
was 65 and early retirement provisions were uncommon.  In the early 1970s 
Aearly retirement provisions@ were introduced by way of guaranteed income for 
persons age 60 and over who lost their jobs.  (Provisions to facilitate early 
retirement began with provisions in specific industries in the private sector in the 
late 1960s).    In 1983, age 60 became the normal retirement age in France.  In 
addition, guaranteed income was provided for persons age 57 and older who lost 
their jobs.  The downward trend in the employment of the 60 to 64 age group was 
continuous over the whole 1968 to 1983 interval in France.  The downward trend 
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continued until the end of the interval.  The downward trend was also facilitated 
by the 1977 Job Release Scheme.   
  After 1983, however, there was a striking divergence in the trends in the 
two countries.  With the 1983 reform establishing age 60 as the normal 
retirement age in France, the downward trend in the employment of older men in 
France continued and was long-lasting, continuing until 1998.  The eventual 
reversal was facilitated by the 1993 reform that increased the number of years of 
work required to get full benefits and reduced the replacement rate.   On the 
other hand, the downward trend in the United Kingdom changed abruptly.  The 
Job Release Scheme was terminated in 1988.  (In addition, private sector firms 
were converting from DB plans—which typically have large early retirement 
incentives—to DC plans without such incentives.  But in the late 1980s most 
older workers were not yet affected by this shift.)  The employment of men 60 to 
64 turned upward in 1993.  In essence, the difference between the post-1983 
trends in France and the United Kingdom arises because the reforms in France 
remained in effect for many years while the reforms in the United Kingdom were 
short-lived.   
    To capture as closely as possible to differences in the reforms ongoing in the 
two countries in different time intervals, we show data for four time periods—
1971, 1983, 1993, and 2005—and the corresponding three intervals.     
  In the years between 1968 and the early 1970s, there was little change in 
the employment or the unemployment of youth in either country.  Thus it is 
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employment or increases in the unemployment of youth in either country (as 
emphasized for France in the prior section). 
 
Figure 5-1.  Comparison of the proportion of older men 






































































































































































Source:  UK Chapter
UK: Price indexation of state pensions in1980. 
End of Job Release Scheme in 1988
F: Retirement at age 60 in 1983.  More years 
of work for full benefits in 1993.  
UK: SERPS in 1975. Job 
Release Scheme in 1977.
F: Several early 
retirement provisions, 
Loi Boulin in 1971
 
  Figures 5-2a and 5-2b and Figure 5-3a and 5-3b summarize the 
differences in the two countries, both with respect to the employment of older 
persons and with respect to the employment and unemployment of the young.   
The comparisons in these figures are based on men only in the 60 to 64 age 
group, but all youth in the 20 to 24 age group.   
  Consider first the results based on the unadjusted data in Figures 5-2.  In 
the years between 1971 and 1983 the employment of older persons was 
declining in both countries.  The employment of youth was also declining in both 
countries and the unemployment of youth was increasing in both countries.  The 
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when the employment trends of older persons diverged in the two countries the 
employment trends for young persons also diverged.  In the UK, with only a small 
decline in the employment of older men between 1983 and 1993, there was little 
change in the employment and unemployment of youth during this period.  
Between 1993 and 2005, the employment of men increased substantially and 
there was an increase in the employment and a decrease in the unemployment 
of youth.  On the other hand, in France, where the employment of the older group 
continued to decline, the employment of youth also declined substantially.  The 
employment of men continued to decline in the UK until 1998 but then began to 
increase.  By 2005 the employment of youth had increased substantially and the 
unemployment of youth had declined slightly.     
  The results based on the adjusted data are shown in Figures 5-3.  The 
general pattern of change in both countries is the same as the pattern based on 
the unadjusted data.   For both the UK and France, however, the trends in the 
adjusted data differ substantially from the trends in the unadjusted data, as 
shown in Figure 2-1f.  The adjusted data, suggests, for example, that in both 
countries much of the fall in the employment of older men between 1971 and 
1983 may be explained by macro shocks to the economies; the differences in the 
adjusted trends are smaller than the differences in the unadjusted trends in both 
countries.  By 2005, the adjusted data show a substantial increase in the 
employment of older men in both countries and a corresponding increase in the 
employment and a decrease in the unemployment of youth in both countries.   
  49 of 74  
Figure 5-2a.  Comparison of employment trends in 

























Figure 5-2b.  Comparison of employment trends in 
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Figure 5-3b.  Comparison of employment trends in 



























  51 of 74   Like the country-specific examples above, this comparison shows natural 
experiment like estimates of the effect of the reforms in each country on the 
employment of older persons in each country, and the relationship between the 
employment of the old and the young in each country.  The differences between 
in the employment trends in the two countries correspond closely to the 
differences in reform in the reforms in the countries.  The findings are clearly 
inconsistent with the boxed economy proposition. 
  Now consider a comparison across all participating countries.  In each of 
the 12 countries, the employment of persons 55 to 64 increased over the last 10 
or 15 years.
4  This can be seen in Figures 2-1a to 2-1l in section 2.  In most 
countries, the increase began between the mid 80s and the mid 90s, but the 
beginning date varied from country to country—between 1983 in the United 
States and 1999 in Italy.  In many countries the increase can be ascribed to a 
particular reform that limited early retirement, as illustrated in some of the 
country-specific illustrations above.  But even if a precipitating reform cannot be 
narrowly identified, it is implausible that a reform, or other event, that precipitated 
the increase in the employment of older persons was motivated by a desire to 
increase the employment—or reduce the unemployment—of youth.  Thus, these 
increases provide a good natural experiment—not plagued by the endogeneity 
                                                 
4 In prior phases of the project, we emphasized the dramatic decline in the labor force participation of men 
60 to 64 between the 1960s and the mid 1990s (Gruber and Wise, 1999).  We also emphasized the reversal 
to an increase in the labor force participation of men 60 to 64 in most of the countries beginning in the mid 
1990s and noted that the increase could be attributed to specific reforms in many countries (Gruber and 
Wise, 2007).  Here we focus on men and women combined and on a broader age interval, 55 to 64 for all 
persons, instead of 60 to 64 for men. 
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on the employment of youth. 
  The results are presented in a series of figures.  Most of the figures are 
based on adjusted data, although some comparison figures are shown for 
unadjusted data as well.  Figure 5-4 shows the difference in the employment rate 
of older persons from the beginning of the upturn to the end of the data in each 
country, together with the difference in the employment and unemployment rate 
of youth.  The countries are ordered by the increase in the employment of older 
persons, from least to greatest.  It is apparent that a greater increase in the 
employment of older persons is not associated with a decrease in the 
employment of youth and is not associated with an increase in the 
unemployment of youth.  On average across all countries the increase in the 
employment of older persons is 8.1 percentage points, the increase in the 
employment of youth is 4.7 percentage points and the decrease in the 
unemployment of youth is 2.6 percentage points. 
  Figure 5-5 shows the fit of the relationship between the employment of 
older persons and the employment of youth.  Figure 5-6 shows the fit of the 
relationship between the employment of older persons and the unemployment of 
youth.  It is clear that if anything, the relationship to youth employment is slightly 
positive and the relationship to youth unemployment slightly negative.  A boxed 
economy view would suggest exactly the opposite. 
  Figure 5-7 compares the six countries (in Figure 5-4) with the least 
increase to the six countries with the greatest increase in the employment of the 
  53 of 74 old.  The six countries with the greatest increase in the employment of the old 
had the greatest increase in the employment of youth and the greatest decrease 
in the unemployment of youth. 
  Because the change in youth employment depends in part on when the 
upturn for older persons began, we have scaled the differences by the ratio of the 
value at the end of the period (the last observation in the data) to the value at the 
beginning of the upturn.  Using this measure, the six countries with the least 
increase are compared to the six with the greatest increase in Figure 5-8.  Based 
on this measure, there is essentially no difference between change in the 
employment and unemployment of youth in the two groups of countries.
5 
Figure 5-4.  Change in the employment of persons 
55-64 and in the employment and unemployment of 
persons 20-24, from beginning of last upturn in 55-
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5 France is excluded from the average ratio for unemployment of youth because the adjusted unemployment 
rate for France declined from a positive to a negative value between the beginning and end of the period. 
Japan is excluded for the same reason. 
  54 of 74 Figure 5-5.  Relationship between the increase in 
55-64 employment and 20-24 employment, from 
beginning of last upturn in 55-64 employment to 
data end, adjusted data
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Figure 5-6.  Relationship between the increase in  
55-64 employment and 20-24 unemployment, from 
beginning of last upturn in 55-64 employment to 
data end, adjusted data
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  56 of 74 Figure 5-9.  Comparison of the 6 countries with the 
least and the greatest increase in 55-64 
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Figure Figure 5-10.  Comparison of the 6 countries 
with the least and the greatest increase in 55-64 
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  57 of 74   As a further check on the comparison, consider the change over the same 
time period for all countries—1995 to 2003.  Again, the six countries with the 
least increase are compared with the six with the greatest increase in the 
employment of older workers.  Figure 5-9 shows the results measured in 
differences and Figure 5-10 the results measured in ratios.
6  Both measures 
show that the six countries with the greatest increase in employment of the older 
group had a slightly greater increase in the employment of youth.  Based on 
either measure, the difference in the unemployment of youth was close to zero.  
Based on the ratio measure (Figure 10), a one percent increase in the 
employment of older persons leads to a 0.51 percent increase in the employment 
of youth and a 0.06 percent decline in the unemployment of youth.  Based on the 
difference measure (Figure 9), a one percentage point increase in the 
employment of older persons leads to a 0.173 percentage point increase in the 
employment of youth and a 0.036 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment of youth.  (These estimates can be compared to panel regression 
estimates shown below.) 
  Thus we conclude that based on this comparison, there is no evidence 
that increasing the employment of older persons reduces the employment, or 
increases the unemployment, of youth. 
  The other side of the comparison of upturns across countries is the 
comparison of downturns.  Most downturns were long-terms and occurred prior 
to the upturns discussed above, as can be seen in Figures 2-1a to 2-1l in section 
                                                 
6 The ratio averages for youth unemployment exclude France, Germany, and Japan because the adjusted 
unemployment values for these countries go from positive values at the beginning of the period to negative 
values at the end of the period. 
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shown above, many of the downturns were precipitated by specific reforms, or by 
a series of reforms.  In this case, we compare the countries with the greatest 
decreases with the countries with the smallest decreases.  We show results 
based on the ratio measure only.  The results are shown in Figures 5-11 and 5-
12 for unadjusted and adjusted data respectively.  The figures show the 
averages over the 6 countries with the smallest decreases in the employment of 
older persons and the average over the 7 “countries” with the greatest 
decreases—the 7 instead of 6 to indicate that one country had two separate 
downward intervals. 
Both figures show that the countries with the greatest decline in the 
employment of the older age group have the greatest decline in the employment 
of the young as well.  The differences are somewhat smaller when based on the 
adjusted data.   
  Like the results above, these comparisons show no evidence that 
reductions in the employment of older persons provides more job opportunities 
for the young.  The results are inconsistent with the boxed economy proposition. 
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Figure 5-12.  Comparison of countries with the 
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  60 of 74 6. Panel Regression Estimates 
  Perhaps the most common way to summarize data series across many 
countries is by way of panel regression estimation.  The panel estimates allow 
control for country-specific attributes that affect the employment and the 
unemployment of the young, but that are not included as covariates in the 
analysis.  Although this method presents a concise estimate of results, it is 
subject to several limitations.  First, taken on its own, this method masks the 
results of “natural experiments” like those discussed above.  Second, in the 
simple specification we have used, the effect of covariates is presumed to be the 
same in all countries.  The results based on adjusted data, presented above, 
allow the effects of the covariates on each of the employment time series to vary 
from country to country.  It is clear that the effect of the covariates differs from 
country to country.  Third, judging by the “natural experiment” segments in the 
data, it seems evident that the most relevant year intervals for comparison—
whether differences, or percent changes, or another measure—are not common 
to all countries.   
  We present panel estimates based on several different specifications.  
The method followed is set out in detail in the appendix.  The key right-hand 
variable is the employment rate of persons 55 to 64.  We also control directly for 
GDP, the growth in GDP, and the proportion of the economy in manufacturing.  
In addition we include country-specific effects, which control for country-specific 
attributes that, in addition to the covariates, affect the employment and the 
  61 of 74 unemployment of youth.   We also include year effects that capture attributes that 
are common to all countries in a given year. 
  The results are shown in Table 6-1.  The table shows the estimated effect 
of the employment of persons 55 to 64 on the unemployment and the 
employment of youth 20 to 24, and on the unemployment and employment of 
prime-age persons 25 to 54.  The table also shows the estimated effect of the 
employment of older persons on the proportion of youth in school. Estimates are 
reported for several specifications:  The first is “levels,” which means that levels 
of employment and unemployment rates are regressed on contemporaneous 
levels of the explanatory variables, including the employment rate of persons 55 
to 64.  The second is “3-year lag,” which means that the employment and 
unemployment rates of youth and prime-age persons in a given year are 
regressed on the employment of older persons three years earlier.  (The other 
covariates are measured in the same year as the youth and prime-age 
employment and unemployment rates.)  The third is “5-year difference,” which 
means that we consider, for example, the difference between youth 
unemployment in a given year to youth unemployment 5 years earlier.  We relate 
this difference to the comparable 5-year differences in employment of older 
persons, and 5-year difference in the other explanatory variables.  The fourth 
specification is “5-year log difference,” which is the same as the third 
specification but the logarithm of unemployment, for example, in a given year is 
compared to the logarithm of unemployment 5 years earlier.  In this case, the 
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associated with a percent difference in the employment of older persons. 
  Estimates are shown with and without controlling for the covariates—GDP 
per capita, growth in GDP, and the manufacturing proportion.   
  The key result is that in each specification, but one, an increase in the 
employment of older persons is estimated to decrease the unemployment rate of 
youth (and prime age persons) and to increase the employment rate of youth 
(and prime-age persons).  Each estimate is statistically different from zero.  The 
only estimate that does not follow this pattern is the estimated effect of 
employment of older persons on the unemployment rate of youth in the “3 year 
lag on elderly” specification, with controls.  And in this case, the estimated effect 
is not statistically different from zero. 
  More precisely, with respect to the unemployment of youth the estimates 
for youth suggest this:  With controls, a one percentage point increase in the 
employment of older persons changes the unemployment rate of youth between 
+0.11 and -0.23 percentage points.  Without controls the decrease is between 
0.09 and 0.44 percentage points.  For the log difference specification with 
controls, a one percent increase in the employment of older persons is 
associated with a 0.91 percent decrease in the unemployment rate of youth.  
Without controls the decrease is 1.87 percent.   
With respect to the employment of youth:  With controls, a one percentage 
point increase in the employment of older persons increases the employment 
rate of youth between 0.54 and 0.91 percentage points.  Without controls the 
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specification with controls, a one percent increase in the employment of older 
persons is associated with a 0.49 percent increase in the unemployment rate of 
youth.  Without controls the increase is 0.61 percent Comparable estimates for 
prime-age persons can be seen in the table. 
  The estimates for each specification also indicate that an increase in the 
employment of older persons is associated with a decrease in the schooling of 
youth.  And each of these estimates is significantly different from zero.  Across all 
specifications, a one percentage point increase in the employment of older 
persons reduces the proportion of youth in school by between 0.17 and 0.70 
percentage points.  A one percent increase in the employment of older persons is 
associated with about a 0.70 percent reduction in the proportion of youth 20 to 24 
in school.  This result is consistent with finding elsewhere that the greater the 
employment rate of youth (or the greater the opportunity for employment) the 
lower school attendance will be. 
  In short, the panel regression results are consistent with the “natural 
experiment” results as well as the results based on increasing and decreasing 
employment intervals for older persons.  The findings provide no support for the 
boxed economy proposition.  Indeed, the weight of the evidence suggests that 
increasing the employment of older persons provides more job opportunities for 
younger persons and reduces the unemployment rate of younger persons.  The 
positive relationship is of course not consistent with the boxed economy 
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such as lower earnings tax rates—that could produce the positive relationship.   
  65 of 74  
Prime Age 25 to 54
UE EMP SCH UE EMP
-0.367 0.663 -0.451 -0.267 0.279
(0.039) (0.076) (0.073) (0.019) (0.042)
-0.092 0.321 -0.391 -0.158 0.065
(0.044) (0.084) (0.073) (0.023) (0.046)
-0.437 0.835 -0.285 -0.282 0.466
(0.062) (0.078) (0.053) (0.030) (0.037)
-1.868 0.611 -0.721 -2.186 0.238
(0.268) (0.063) (0.160) (0.253) (0.021)
-0.232 0.912 -0.911 -0.191 0.416
(0.055) (0.090) (0.094) (0.027) (0.053)
0.110 0.541 -0.804 -0.056 0.136
(0.056) (0.098) (0.089) (0.029) (0.057)
-0.193 0.573 -0.179 -0.115 0.288
(0.081) (0.094) (0.072) (0.039) (0.044)
-0.905 0.486 -0.619 -0.960 0.144
(0.329) (0.090) (0.240) (0.260) (0.028)
Reported is the coefficient on elderly employment
Levels










Table 6-1. Panel estimates of the effect of the LFP of persons 55 to 64 on 
the unemployment rate, employment rate, and schooling of younger 
persons
Specification
Youth 20 to 24
No Controls
Controls include gdp per capita, growth in gdp per capita, and manf share.  Each specification 
also includes country fixed effects and year fixed effects.
5-year log difference means that we take the log of each X and Y variable, then take 5 year 
differences.
3-year lag means that we regress the dependent variable on a 3 year lag of elderly employment
Levels regression means that we regress levels on levels.
5-year difference means that we take 5th differences for the RHS and the LHS variables.
 
 
  66 of 74 7.  Summary and Conclusions 
  In this volume, we direct attention to the oft-claimed proposition that 
incentives to induce older persons to retire—inherent in the provisions of social 
security systems—were prompted by youth unemployment.  And that if the 
incentives to retire were removed, and older persons stayed longer in the labor 
force, the job opportunities of youth would be reduced.  We find no evidence to 
support this boxed economy proposition.  We find no evidence that increasing 
the labor force participation of older persons reduces the job opportunities of 
young persons.  Indeed the evidence suggests that greater labor force 
participation of older persons is associated with greater youth employment and 
with reduced youth unemployment. 
  The results shown in this summary are based on data from the individual 
country papers.  Some of the data in the papers was borrowed to use in natural 
experiment illustrations.  The data from all of the country papers was also pooled 
to obtain estimates based on the collective information from all of the countries 
combined.  We began the introduction by showing that the enormous waves of 
women entering the labor force over the past several decades varied 
substantially across countries and were unrelated to the small changes in the 
labor force participation of men across countries.   
We ask whether the economic world might be different for young versus 
old employees.  We presented results based on several different methods of 
inference.  A striking feature of the results is the strong similarity of the findings 
based on these quite different methods of estimation.  First we show that the tax 
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of the labor, as shown in the first phase of the project—is slightly positively 
related to the unemployment of youth and slightly negatively related to the 
employment rate of youth.  Second, we show within-country “natural 
experiments” that demonstrate the relationship between within-country reforms 
and the consequent changes in the employment of the old on the one hand and 
changes in the employment of the young on the other hand.  In each case, 
decreases in the employment of the old are associated with decreases in the 
employment of the young and increases in the unemployment of the young.  
Third, we show cross-country comparisons based on various comparison 
methods.  For example, we show that the labor force participation of older 
persons began to increase sometime during the last 10 or 15 years and that the 
countries with the greatest increase in the employment of older persons had the 
greatest increase in the employment of the young and the greatest decline in the 
unemployment of the young.  Fourth, we show more formal estimates based on 
panel regression analysis, based on various specifications.  Like the results 
based on the other methods, the findings based on formal regression analysis 
show that when the employment of older persons is increased the employment of 
the young is increased and the unemployment of the young is decreased.   
  We emphasize that the results are made possible by the wealth of 
experiences across the countries that provides considerable policy variation 
including exogenous variation that is not induced by high youth unemployment 
and that better enables us to establish the causal effect of increased older-
  68 of 74 worker employment on youth employment.  Thus we believe that the results 
reported in this phase of the project, as well as in the previous phases, provides 
a strong rational for international comparisons. 
  In short, the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as well as the evidence 
from each of the several different methods of estimation, is contrary to the boxed 
economy proposition.  We find no evidence that increasing the employment of 
older persons will reduce the employment opportunities of youth and no evidence 
that increasing the employment of older persons will increase the unemployment 
of youth. 




We want to adjust the employment series for macro changes that may affect 
each of the employment series.  The variables we use to make the adjustment 
are GDP per capita, growth in GDP, and the percent of the economy in 
manufacturing.  This is the procedure we follow:  Suppose the employment 
series is Y and the adjuster variables are  12 ,, 3 X X and X .  Then for each series in 
each country we estimate  
 




and obtain the estimated values     
12 ,, and β ββ .  We let the first year,  , of each 
employment series be the base.  Then each subsequent year is adjusted based 
on the change in the
1 Y
X variables between period 1 and period t.  The adjusted 
value of Y in period t is given by 
 
     





We follow a standard panel estimation procedure, with 
 
(20 24) 0 1 55 64 2 () it it it i t it YE X c y u β ββ −− =+ + + + + 
 
where indexes countries and   indexes years,Y is youth employment or youth 
unemployment, or prime age employment or unemployment, or 
schooling,
i t
X represents the covariates, the  are country fixed effects, and 
the
i c
t y are year effects. 
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  The text presents the results of several different ways to asses the effect 
of the employment of older persons on the employment of youth.  In principle, 
this approach provides an all-inclusive estimate of the relationship between the 
employment rates of the two groups.  In particular, in addition to the strong 
relationship between the provisions of social security programs and the labor 
force participation of older workers—which has been demonstrated in earlier 
phases of the project—the employment of older workers depends on other 
economic influences as well.  For example, macro economic shocks to the 
economy can affect the employment of older persons, as can be seen in the 
comparison of the unadjusted and adjusted employment trends in each of the 
countries.   
 
  Much public discussion, however, is focused on the need for the 
incentives to induce older persons to retire so that the job prospects for younger 
people will be improved.  This is often used both as an explanation for the 
introduction the incentive in the first place and, now, as a reason for not removing 
the incentives.  Thus we believe it would be useful to present evidence on the 
direct relationship between the incentives for older persons to leave the labor 
force and the employment of youth.  We approached this question by calculating 
a time series index of the average incentives faced by persons who were retired 
in each year.   
 
The index, as well as potential estimation methods, is described below.  In 
practice, however, the approach was not replicable across countries.  There are 
several possible reasons for this.   One reason is that it is unclear whether an 
accurate measure of the incentives faced by all persons retired in a year can be 
obtained.   A second reason is that even if an accurate average can be 
calculated, the average may not be sufficient, it is the broad range of incentives 
faced by individuals that matters. The extremes may be more important than the 
average, for example.  We have shown in earlier phases of the project that the 
incentives faced by individuals matter.   
 
The incentive faced by persons of age ain year is given by  y
 
[ ] {} (,) (,) (,) (,) (,) I ay Way Way P Vay qay α =+ −    
 
Here, is the social security wealth (the present discounted value of future 
benefits) that a person would receive at age in year
(,) Way
a y  and is a weight 
explained below.  And[
(,) qay
] (,) (,) Way P Vay − is the gain that could be obtained if a 
person delayed retirement to the age at which benefits would be at their “peak 
value” .  (, PV a y)
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incentive they faced when approaching retirement depends on the persons age 
at that time. So to get the average incentive, we must average over the ages of 
persons retired in year y.  Here we assume, for illustration, that the possible ages 
are from 55 to 59.  The youngest age 55 is assumed to be the earliest age that 
any benefits are available.  Now the average for year y is obtained by weighting 




























But we don’t know at what age a person retired.  A person who is 59, for 
example, could have retired at 55, 56, 57, 58, or 59.  A person who is 55 must 
have retired at 55.  Thus we must consider the incentive the person would have 
faced at each of the possible ages the persons could have retired.    If the person 
is 55, there is only one term in the second bracket.  If the person is 59, there are 
five terms.   
 
If the weight given to age  in year is , then the average can be 
written as 
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If accurate, this could be interpreted as “the tax force to retire” that was 
faced by persons who were observed to be retired in year y , the term we used to 
describe the incentive to retire faced by persons between the early retirement 
age and age 69 in Phase one of the project and as used in section 3 in this 
introduction. 
 
Now we need to determine an appropriate way to approximate the relative 
weight to give to each possible age of retirement.  We assume that the weight is 
proportional to the proportion of persons in the labor force in the year before the 
retirement age.  That is, the assumption is that the likelihood that a person faced 
a particular incentive depends on the proportion of persons in the labor force the 
year before the person attained that age.  If, for example, as the LFP was 
declining over the years the person aged from 55 to 59, we assume that the 
  72 of 74 person was most likely to face the incentive appropriate to 55, less likely to face 
the incentive appropriate to 56, and so forth.  Now we have 
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 where  
 
[ ] {} (,) 1 (,) (,) (,) I at yt W at yt W at yt P V at yt α −− = ⋅ −− + ⋅ −− − −−
 
 
To estimate () I y we need to determineα , that is we need to determine the 
relative weight given to the two components of the index.  Suppose we set the 
weight on equal to 1, as set out in the equation above.  Then we 
need only determine the relative weight
(, Wa ty t −− )
α on[ ] (,) (,) Wa ty t P Va ty t − −− − − .  
There are at least two ways to do this.  One way is to regress the proportion of 
older persons in the labor in a year on the index () I y  , where the index value is 
based on different values ofα , and then choose theα that maximizes the 
regression r-squared value. 
 
Estimation can also be based on independently estimated averages of the 
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Notice that these means are obtained by calculating the measures at the 
individual age-year levels and then averaging over the individual age-year 
measures.  In this case, the value ofα is determined by a time series regression 
of the labor force participation of older workers on these two components, setting 
the coefficient on () Wyequal to 1 and estimating theα coefficient on[ ]() WP Vy − .   
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